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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No, 1: Did the trial court properly consider evidence of the value of
the property in determining whether a fraudulent transfer had occurred?
Standard of Review: Defendant did not object to evidence of the value of
the house at trial therefore the appellate court will reverse only if the trial
court committed plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346
(Utah 2000).
Issue No. 2: Did the Trial Court Properly Value the house in determining if
it was an asset under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act?
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's findings
of fact for clear error. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d
887(1999).
Standard of Review as stated by the Appellants:
The appellate court will not disturb the trial court's decision unless
there was a clear abuse of discretion. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,
433 (Utah 1994).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated §25-6-5 (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Florida judgment was entered against Appellant Mr. Bobby Larry
Cooper in favor of Appellee Margaret Everson in the amount of $60,385.76.
This judgment was domesticated in Utah on November 7, 2005. On
November 30, 2005, Appellant Cooper fraudulently transferred his interest
in the subject property without receiving any compensation. At trial, the
Appellants did not provide evidence that a lien encumbered the property on
November 30, 2005. Rather, the Appellants provided evidence that the
property was encumbered in February 2006, three months after the
fraudulent conveyance.
At trial, the Appellants did not object to evidence of the property's
value, including the Washington County tax records from 2008. The trial
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and ruled that the
Appellants had fraudulently conveyed the property.

The Appellants have

challenged the trial court's use of the 2008 tax record, but have not
adequately challenged the trial court's findings, have not marshaled all
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court, and have not

demonstrated that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Margaret Everson, is an individual resident of Lake County,

State of Florida. R. 173.
2.

Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., is an individual resident of

Washington County, State of Utah. R. 173.
3.

Appellant, Laurel Ann Cooper is an individual resident of

Washington County, State of Utah, and is also the Trustee of the Laurel Ann
Cooper Family Trust. R. 173.
4.

Margaret Everson and the Appellant Bobby Cooper were

previously legally married as husband and wife. R. 174.
5.

The Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, issued a

final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, ending the marriage of the
parties on June 1, 1989. R. 175, R. 196 P. 7.
6.

As part of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage,

Appellant was ordered to pay plaintiff rehabilitative alimony as set forth in
the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. R. 175.
7.

Appellant Bobby Cooper did not comply with his financial

obligations imposed by the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. R.
175.
8.

The arrearage issue was litigated in the state of Florida and the

Florida court found Appellant Cooper in contempt of Court for his willful
disregard and failure to comply with the obligations imposed by the Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. R. 158, Exhibit #6.

9.

The Florida court entered a Final Judgment in this matter on or

about May 13, 2005, in the total sum of $60,385.76 against Appellant Bobby
Cooper. R. 158, Exhibit #5.
10.

The Florida Judgment was entered as a Foreign Judgment in the

State of Utah on November 7, 2005, in the Fifth District Court of
Washington County, Case No. 056502368. R. 167.
11.

Appellant Bobby Cooper did not contest the filing of the

foreign judgment in the State of Utah in November of 2005 nor any time
since then. R. 196, P. 11.
12.

Appellant Bobby Cooper did participate in the Florida

proceedings which led to the entry of the Final Judgment against him. R.
158, Exhibit #8.
13.

Since entry of the monetary judgments against Appellant

Bobby Cooper, he has not paid plaintiff any sums of money towards the
outstanding judgments and sums that he owes the plaintiff. R. 196, P. 7.
14.

On or about January 29, 2004, Appellants purchased real

property in Washington County, Utah, more specifically described as:
All of Lot Twenty-Six (26), Building H. SKY RIDGE
TOWNHOMES (P.U.D.), according to the Official Plat
thereof, on file in the Office of the Recorder of
Washington County, State of Utah.
TOGETHER WITH all improvements and appurtenances
thereunto belonging.
SUBJECT TO encumbrances, easements, rights of way,
restrictions, and reservations of record and those
enforceable in law and equity.
PARCEL #: H-SRTH-H-26-RD. R. 158, Exhihibit 1.

15.

The Appellants Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr.'s and Laurie A.

Cooper's interest in the property was memorialized in the Warranty Deed and they took as husband and wife and as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship. R. 158, Exhibit 1.
16.

The individual Appellants held title to the Washington County

property from January 2004 through the end of November 2005. R. 158,
Exhibits 1 and 2.
17.

On November 30, 2005, the individual Appellants executed a

Quit Claim Deed quit claiming their interest in the subject property from
themselves to the defendant Laurel Ann Cooper as Trustee of the Laurel
Ann Cooper Family Trust dated November 23, 2005 R. 158, Exhibit #2.
18.

The Appellant Laurel Ann Cooper then executed two other

deeds conveying the same property, one to herself and one to herself as
Trustee of the family trust. R. 158. Exhibits 3 and 4, respectively.
19.

Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., had no other appreciable

assets with an appreciable value after his deed of the subject real estate on
November 30, 2005. R. 196, P. 24.
20.

The only asset the Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr.,

indicated that he owned was a half-share of water in a water company in
Utah County which had an estimated value of less than $2000-$3000. R.
196, P. 24.
21.

Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., did not receive any

consideration from any individual, including Appellant Laurel Ann Cooper,
when he conveyed the subject real estate out of his name and into Laurel
Ann Cooper's name as Trustee of her family trust in November of 2005, and
the other Appellants did not pay any consideration for the transfer of the
property out of Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr.'s name. R. 196, P. 24.

22.

Appellant Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., appeared in the foreign

judgment matter for a motion and order in supplemental proceedings. Said
Supplemental Order Proceedings were held on or about August 7, 2006. R.
158, Exhibit 7.
23.

At the motion and order in supplemental proceedings, the

Appellant, Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., filled out a questionnaire wherein he
indicated that he was paying monthly rent of $700 per month; had monthly
income of $1508 per month; and did not own any other assets other than $45
in cash and a balance in his checking account of $675. R. 158, Exhibit 7.
24.

Appellants Bobby Larry Cooper, Sr., and Laurel Cooper

maintained a joint checking account into which all of his social security
check was deposited, and he used at least $700 of that towards household
expenses, and most likely, for house payments, as indicated in his sworn
testimony at the Supplemental Proceedings hearing in August of 2006. R.
196, PP. 24-25.
25.

The Appellants introduced evidence at trial of the value of the

real estate including the Washington County Tax Records. R. 196, P. 5. R.
158, Exhibit #9.
26. The real estate has an estimated value of at least $181,638. R.
158, Exhibit #9.
27.

The Appellant Laurel Cooper incurred a mortgage on the

property in 2006. R. 196, P. 6, R. 158, Exhibit #11.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellants introduced Washington County Tax records from
2004 through 2008 into evidence at trial to show the value of the subject

property. The Appellants never objected to the introduction of this evidence
as proof of the property's value. The Appellants provided no other evidence
of the property's value. Because the Appellants did not object to the 2008
tax records they must show plain error, i.e. that an error exists, that it should
have been obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful.

The

Appellants have not, and cannot, show plain error.
The Appellants cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion in
valuing the property because they did not object to the evidence of value at
trial, did not introduce evidence that the property was encumbered by a valid
lien in November 2005, have not cited any authority that would indicate that
the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the property, have not
adequately challenged the trial courts findings of fact, and have not argued
how the trial court's value of the property had any affect on its conclusions
of law.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1
Did the trial court properly consider evidence of the value of the
house in determining whether a fraudulent transfer had occurred?
The Appellants did not object to evidence of the value of the house
at trial therefore the appellate court will reverse only if the trial court

committed plain error. State v.Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah
2000).
The Appellants introduced evidence of the tax assessed value of the
property at trial including the Washington County tax records from 2004 to
2008. The Appellants did not object to the introduction of any of these
values. The Appellants did not introduce any evidence of the fair market
value of the home, any appraisal, or any other evidence or argument in
support of their position that the court improperly valued the home. The
Appellants did not properly preserve the issue of value below and it is
reviewed for plain error.
A party must object to the admission of evidence at trial to preserve
the issue for appeal. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, | 9, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah
2002); Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, 214 P.3d 865 (Utah
2009).
[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i)[a]n error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict
is undermined.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).

o

Here, the Appellants have alleged an error, but have not cited any
authority to support that allegation.

The Appellants have not alleged that

the error was or should have been obvious to the court. The Appellants have
not set forth any facts or arguments that absent the alleged error there is a
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the Appellants.
In Hill v. Estate of Allred, the Supreme Court of Utah engaged in a
plain error analysis that is illustrative. 2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929 (Utah
2009). There the appellant alleged plain error because the trial court did not
apportion joint and several liability in a civil conspiracy case. The Hill
appellant alleged that Utah case law was directly on point regarding liability
for civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court of Utah explained that Jedrziewski
v. Smith, 2005 UT 85, f 10, 128 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2005), the precedent
setting case, made clear that an error occurred in Ms. Hill's case and that
liability for civil conspiracy should have been joint and several.

The

Supreme Court, however, ruled that though Jedrziewski was on point,
another case had somewhat confused the issue of joint and several liability
and therefore the trial court's error was not obvious.
Here, the Appellants cannot point this Court to any authority that
would make the trial court's valuation of the property erroneous. Further,
even assuming error, the Appellants have not alleged that the error was

obvious. Therefore, the trial court did not commit plain error, its ruling
should be affirmed, and the Appellants appeal should be dismissed.
Issue No. 2
Did the Trial Court Properly Value the house in determining if
it was an asset under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act?
"The appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for
clear error.'5 Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887 (1999).
In reviewing for clear error, the appellate court only reverses when the
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the Court otherwise
reaches a firm conviction that a mistake has been made," Cowley v. Porter,
2005 UT App 518,142, 127 P.3d 1224 (2005).
In Bradford the appellate court was asked to determine whether a
fraudulent transfer occurred. The court explained the applicable standard as
follows:
First, did Mrs. Bradford's conveyance of her joint tenancy
interest in the home constitute a fraudulent transfer? Because
this issue involves both questions of law and of fact, we review
the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. See Jeffs v.
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). MIn contrast, we
review a trial court's conclusions as to the legal effect of a given
set of found facts for correctness." Id. (citing State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). Nevertheless, ff[w]e may still grant
the trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given
fact situation." Id.
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, P10, 993 P.2d 887, 889 (1999).

The Appellants introduced the very evidence that they now contend
should not have been used by the trial court in valuing the home. In their
brief the Appellants assert that "both parties agreed that the value of the
property was in line with the [2005] value assessed by Washington County."
The Appellants provide no support for this contention and there is nothing in
the record indicating any such agreement. The Appellants did not offer any
other evidence of the fair market value of the home.
The Appellants' reasoning that the home was not an asset because it
was encumbered by a lien is contrary to the evidence that Appellants
introduced at trial. Trial Exhibit #9 indicated that the Appellant Ms. Cooper
incurred a mortgage on the home in February 2006, over two months after
Ms. Everson domesticated her judgment in Utah.
The Appellants have apparently challenged paragraph 30 of the trial
court's findings wherein the trial court stated "In 2008, the Washington
County Assessor's estimate of the market value of the Cooper home was
$181,638.00." R. 176. The trial court never stated that it was valuing the
home at $181,638; merely that amount was introduced at trial. Moreover,
Appellant has not argued that the trial court had to make a specific finding as
to the value of the home, had to determined if the property was encumbered
by a lien, or was required to value the property or explain how it came to the

conclusion concerning value. The Appellants did not address these issues at
trial or in its opening brief and has not pointed to any authority to challenge
the trial court's findings.
In Saunders v. Sharp, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that:
An appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury
nor the findings of fact made by a trial court. If a challenge is
made to the findings, an appellant must marshal all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact. If the appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
Here, the Appellants have not marshaled any facts as found by the
trial court, except to say that there are no facts to marshal. The Appellants
have not viewed the evidence they themselves presented at trial concerning
value in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. The Appellants
have not demonstrated that those facts are insufficient to support the findings
of fact.

Therefore, this Court must assume that the record supports the

findings of the trial court.
Given that the findings are accurate, the Appellants have in no way
shown that they are clearly erroneous or that the trial court improperly

1 O

applied the Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Appellants have not and cannot
argue that the trial court misapplied the Fraudulent Transfer Act because the
trial court applied all the elements of Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-5 and
specifically concluded that the property was the Appellant Bobby Cooper's
only substantial asset, based on the findings and ruled that the Appellants
had fraudulently transferred the property based, again, on the findings. Utah
Code Annotated § 25-6-5.
The Appellants' cited standard of review also indicates that the trial
court has broad discretion in rulings concerning property division and an
appellate court will only disturb the trial court's ruling if there is a clear
abuse of discretion. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah 1994).
The Appellants have not cited any authority, including the statute itself,
indicating that the trial court must place a value on the home to determine if
it was fraudulently transferred.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-5.

The

Appellants have not cited any authority regarding how the trial court should
have valued the home. The Appellants have not cited any authority to show
that the court must explain how it valued the home. The Appellants have not
cited any authority to show that the Court has to consider the value of the
home in making its conclusions.

The Appellants have not cited any

authority to support their contention that it is an abuse of discretion to look
at tax rolls over a period of time to determine value of property.
The Appellants have cited the definition of asset under the
Fraudulent Transfer Act, but have not explained or even attempted to
explain if or how the valuation of an asset affects whether the Act has been
violated.

Indeed, it is completely plausible that the tax assessed value

underestimated the actual fair market value and the trial court weighed the
housing market in Washington County, evidence of how much the
Appellants paid for the home originally, and other evidence introduced at
trial in making its conclusions.

The Appellants did not ask for any

clarification at trial or thereafter, did not raise any of the above mention
issues or object at trial or thereafter or in their opening brief, and cannot
show any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The only case cited by the Appellants supports the fact that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion: "There is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of properties in a divorce action[;] the trial court has
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 433 (Utah 1994).

Therefore, the trial court properly valued the

home and correctly concluded that the Appellants violated the fraudulent

transfer act. The Appellants have not shown clear error nor have they shown
an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants did not object the Washington County Assessor's
2008 value of the property and in fact introduced that evidence at trial. The
Appellants have not shown that the Trial Court committed plain error in
citing this value in its findings of fact.

The Appellants have not even

attempted a plain error or a clear error analysis. The Appellants have not
cited any authority to show that the Trial Court improperly consider the
2008 value. The Appellants have not adequately challenged the trial courts
findings.
The trial court's findings are supported by the record and even if
they were not, they are presumed to be supported because the Appellant's
have not properly challenged the findings. The trial court accurately applied
the Fraudulent Transfer Act to its findings in making is conclusions of law.
The trial court was not clearly erroneous nor did it abuse its discretion in
valuing the property, did not commit plain error in citing to the 2008 tax
records, and its ruling should be affirmed.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Appellee requests an award against the Appellants for attorney's fees and
costs. The Appellants' brief is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, and the Appellants have not set forth any good faith arguments
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. The Appellants have ignored the
facts - they introduced the evidence they now challenge - they introduced
the evidence of tax assed value and did not provide any additional evidence
or formula for valuation of the home. The Appellants have not cited any
existing authority for their position. The only result of the appeal has been
the Appellants have had additional time at the property and have prevented
the Appellee from collecting the alimony judgment. Therefore, the Appellee
respectfully requests that this Court award her costs and attorney's fees in
defending this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
LAMARJWINWARD
Attorney for Margaret Everson
EaMar J Winward
Utah Bar No. A3 528
150 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(435)628-1191
lwinward@infovvest.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF
OF THE APPELLEE, was mailed by first-class mail on this the 9th day of
February, 2010 to the following:
Reed R. Braithwaite
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770

A copy of the digital submission on compact disc was mailed to:
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

150 NortK200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(435)628-1191
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ADDENDUM

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE
Title/Chapter/Section:

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search
1 ^o r ° J

Utah Code
Title 25 Fraud
Chapter 6 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Section 5 Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor
made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the
debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts
beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, among other
factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened
with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the
asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to
an insider of the debtor.
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 25 06 000500.ZIP 2,504 Bytes
« Previous Section (25-6-4)

Next Section (25-6-6) »
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